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This paper investigates incomplete information and signaling about players￿inequity aver-
sion in the simultaneous and sequential-move prisoner￿ s dilemma game. We ￿rst evaluate the
role of incomplete information according to: (1) whether uncertainty helps select the e¢ cient
equilibrium outcome, and (2) whether more cooperation can be sustained under incomplete
than under complete information. We then examine the possibility of information transmission
among individuals in a signaling game. A separating equilibrium can be supported in which
players with high concerns about fairness bear the cost of cooperating in order to reveal their
type to opponents, thus promoting cooperation in subsequent periods. We also ￿nd a pool-
ing equilibrium in which a player unconcerned about inequity aversion initially cooperates in
order to mislead the uninformed player. This misleading strategy induces cooperation from
the uninformed player in the subsequent stage of the game, moment at which the unconcerned
player takes the opportunity to defect. This ￿backstabbing￿equilibrium helps explain frequently
observed behavior in ￿nitely-repeated experiments.
Keywords: Prisoner￿ s Dilemma; Inequity aversion; Incomplete Information; Signaling.
JEL classification: C72, C73, D82.1 Introduction
A large body of experimental evidence suggests that many individuals appear to exhibit concerns
for fairness in the income distribution, also referred as ￿social￿ preferences. Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) have provided models where the incorporation of such
social preferences can help to explain experimental ￿ndings, in particular, greater-than-predicted
￿cooperative￿behavior, that would be di¢ cult to rationalize under standard, ￿sel￿sh￿preferences.
Most theoretical analysis of the role of social preferences has been developed in complete information
settings, wherein players are able to perfectly observe the extent of one anothers￿concerns for
fairness, i.e., the parameters one another￿ s social preference functions. This assumption may be
reasonable in certain contexts, for instance, when players have interacted with one another for
several previous periods. However, complete information regarding the extent to which players
have social preferences seems less sensible if players are unfamiliar with the strategic environment
or have had no interactions with their opponents, a situation that characterizes the initial round(s)
of play of many experimental games.
This paper contributes to the literature on the role of social preferences in fostering cooperative
behavior by studying the case where players have incomplete information regarding the extent of
other player￿ s social preferences, speci￿cally, incomplete information about other player￿ s concerns
for fairness in the distribution of payo⁄s. We study this issue using simultaneous- and sequential-
move versions of the canonical Prisoner￿ s Dilemma (PD) game played either once or a ￿nite number
of times.1
As our benchmark, we ￿rst investigate the one-shot, simultaneous-move PD game under com-
plete information. We show that when players are unconcerned about fairness, defection remains
a strictly dominant strategy, as in the standard prisoner￿ s dilemma. In contrast, when players are
concerned about fairness, players￿best response function is to ￿mimic￿the other player￿ s action:
cooperate when the other player cooperates and defect otherwise. Therefore, under complete in-
formation about social preferences, the prisoner￿ s dilemma becomes strategically equivalent to a
Pareto coordination game.2
We then introduce incomplete information about players social preferences into the one-shot
simultaneous move PD game evaluating the e⁄ects of such uncertainty on equilibrium play according
to two criteria: (1) whether cooperation can be sustained more generally (i.e., for a wider range
of social preference parameter values) when players face uncertainty about each others￿ social
preferences than when they do not; and (2) if the introduction of uncertainty can be used as a means
of selecting the e¢ cient equilibrium outcome among the multiple equilibria that are supported under
1PD games are strategically equivalent to public good games as well as to games of imperfect competition among
￿rms where actions are strategic substitutes. Sequential move versions are also used to characterized ￿rm-worker
wage-e⁄ort decisions and the notion of ￿gift-exchange￿ .
2This result relates with that of Rabin (1993) for psychological games. Indeed, he predicts that players behave
according to the above best response function if they are su¢ ciently motivated by the kindness they infer from
other players￿actions. Rabin (1993) assumes, however, that individuals￿kindness parameters are common knowledge
among the players. In contrast, we extend our study by allowing for incomplete information.
1complete information. In the case of the simultaneous-move game we show that uncertainty allows
for partial cooperation to occur and that mutual cooperation is the unique equilibrium outcome
that can be sustained when both players have su¢ ciently high concerns about fairness; this ￿nding
stands in contrast to the complete information game where multiple equilibria exist under the same
conditions.
We next analyze the sequential version of the PD game. Under complete information, the
second mover ￿mimics￿the ￿rst mover￿ s action when he is su¢ ciently concerned about fairness,
but defects otherwise. Given this best response, the ￿rst mover cooperates when the second mover is
su¢ ciently concerned about fairness but defects otherwise, supporting, as a consequence, a unique
equilibrium outcome.3 Therefore, the introduction of uncertainty in the sequential-move PD game
does not render equilibrium-selection bene￿ts. Nonetheless, we show that incomplete information
in this case does allow for partial cooperation to occur for social preference parameter values that
would allow for only mutual defection under complete information.
We further investigate the role of uncertainty regarding social preferences in twice-repeated
versions of the simultaneous and sequential-move PD games. In this context, we analyze a signaling
game in which players use their actions to communicate their social preferences to other individuals.
In particular, we suppose that one player privately observes his own concern for fairness, while the
social preferences of the other player are common knowledge. Players interact in a simultaneous
prisoner￿ s dilemma game in the ￿rst period, at the end of which payo⁄s are accrued, allowing every
player to infer his opponent￿ s chosen action. In the second and ￿nal period, players interact in a
simultaneous game again, and payo⁄s are distributed. We ￿rst identify a separating equilibrium
in which only highly concerned players cooperate in the ￿rst-period game whereas unconcerned
players defect. Speci￿cally, we show that when the informed player is su¢ ciently concerned about
fairness, he may choose to cooperate during the ￿rst period of the game in order to convey his
social concerns to the uninformed player, inducing the latter to cooperate in the subsequent period.
This result suggests that uninformed subjects might respond to kind actions (cooperation) with
kind actions, even when they only sustain preferences for fairness, but they do not have intrinsic
concerns for intentions or reciprocity in their preferences.4
We also identify a pooling equilibrium in which both types of informed players cooperate during
the ￿rst-period game of the simultaneous PD game. An informed player who is unconcerned
with fairness chooses to cooperate, pooling with the uniformed player who is highly concerned with
3Our results under complete information relate with those in Dufwenberg and Kirchteiger (2004) and Falk and
Fischbacher (2006) which, in the context of sequential-move psychological games, show that the second mover behaves
according to the above best response if he is su¢ ciently motivated by reciprocity. Similarly to Rabin (1993), however,
these papers assume that individuals￿reciprocity parameters are common knowledge among the players. In contrast,
we extend our analysis to the case in which every player observes his own concern for fairness but not his opponents￿ .
4In this regard, our results relate to those in Fong (2009) where, in the context of the gift-exchange game under
incomplete information about altruism, he shows that the donor might exaggerate his gifts to the recipient in order
to reveal his strong altruistic concerns. Such ￿gift exaggeration￿triggers reciprocal behavior afterwards even when
agents have no concerns for reciprocity. Similarly, Cason and Mui (2009) provide experimental data showing that, for
the divide-and-conquer game, players can convey their social preferences to other individuals through their actions in
the repeated game (or through actual communication), helping to ameliorate the ￿rst-mover￿ s transgression against
two responders.
2fairness in order to ￿mislead￿the uninformed player about his actual concerns for fairness. If priors
are su¢ ciently high, this misleading strategy attracts the uninformed player towards cooperation
in the subsequent second period at which point the unconcerned player takes the opportunity to
defect, i.e., he ￿stabs the uninformed player in the back.￿(We refer to this strategy pro￿le as the
￿backstabbing￿equilibrium.) Interestingly, this equilibrium provides an explanation for a relatively
common observation in experimental settings, whereby subjects defect in the last period of their
interaction, despite a previous history of cooperation; see for instance, Selten and Stoecker (1986)
and Andreoni and Miller (1993) for the prisoner￿ s dilemma, McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) for the
centipede game and Camerer and Weigelt (1988) and Brandts and Figueras (2003) for a borrower-
lender game. Importantly, this informational explanation, does not rely on subjects￿inability to
understand the rules of the game, or failure to backward induct but rests instead on the existence
of incomplete information about other players￿social preferences.
Healy (2007) identi￿es a similar result in the context of a ￿nitely-repeated gift-exchange game
where the ￿rm manager does not observe the worker￿ s type (assumed to be either reciprocator
or sel￿sh￿ Healy￿ s results do not derive from any preference speci￿cations). To facilitate a com-
parison of our results with those in Healy (2007), we modify the above signaling game in order
to make it strategically equivalent to the gift-exchange game. In particular, we examine a twice-
repeated sequential-move prisoner￿ s dilemma game where the ￿rst mover is uninformed about the
second-mover￿ s social preferences.5 We show that a pooling equilibrium not only emerges in the
simultaneous but also in the sequential version of the game. Speci￿cally, the privately informed
player (second mover) uses a ￿backstabbing￿strategy by disguising himself as an individual with
high concerns about fairness during the ￿rst-period game (cooperating) in order to defect in the
second-period game. We demonstrate, nonetheless, that this ￿backstabbing￿equilibrium can be
supported under di⁄erent parameter conditions in the simultaneous and sequential-move versions
of the PD game. Speci￿cally, our results predict that more (less) cooperation can be sustained in
the simultaneous- than in the sequential-move version of the PD game if the ￿rst-mover￿ s concerns
for fairness are relatively high (low, respectively). Importantly, we show that these results are not
only applicable to the case in which only one player is uninformed about his opponent￿ s social
preference parameters, but also to settings where all players are uninformed about each others￿
social preferences.
Bolle and Ockenfels (1990) have also analyzed the PD game when players do not observe each
others￿altruistic motives. They mainly focus on the behavior of the second-mover in the sequential-
move version of the game. By contrast, our model analyzes equilibrium play under more general
time and information structures: the simultaneous and sequential version of the game, both under
complete and incomplete information, which allows for a richer set of comparisons. Additionally,
we allow for signaling to occur in the ￿nitely repeated game which, as suggested above, can help
5Indeed, note that in this game the ￿rst-mover cooperates only when he believes that the second-mover will
reciprocate afterwards (which occurs when the second-mover is highly concerned about fairness). These strategic
incentives coincide with those in the gift-exchange game analyzed by Healy (2007) whereby the ￿rm manager only
o⁄ers high wages when he believes that the worker is a reciprocating type.
3to rationalize several experimental observations.
Finally, note that the behavioral assumptions in this paper are related to those in Kreps et al.
(1982). In particular, they show that cooperation can be sustained in the ￿nitely-repeated prisoner￿ s
dilemma game as long as both players believe that there is a small probability that his opponent
is ￿irrational,￿i.e., plays a conditionally cooperative tit-for-tat strategy. In particular, Kreps et al.
(1982) consider that both players are uncertain about each other￿ s stage payo⁄s, i.e., every player
ignores the bene￿t that his opponent obtains from mutual cooperation. In contrast, they show
that their conclusions would not hold in a context of one-sided uncertainty in which it is common
knowledge that defection constitutes a dominant strategy for the uninformed player.6 In this paper
we show that Kreps et al.￿ s (1982) cooperative results can be extended to environments with one-
sided uncertainty as well. Speci￿cally, this occurs when it is common knowledge that the uninformed
player￿ s best-response is to ￿mimic￿his opponent￿ s actions. In that setting, the ￿backstabbing￿
equilibrium predicts cooperation during the ￿rst period of play by players unconcerned about
fairness who attempt to convince their uninformed opponents that they are concerned about fairness
when in fact they are not.7
The structure of the paper is as follows. The following section presents the model. Section three
compares equilibrium outcomes in the simultaneous-move game under complete and incomplete
information. Section four makes a similar comparison for the sequential-move version of the game.
In section ￿ve we investigate the extent of information transmission about privately observed social
preferences between players in twice-repeated versions of the simultaneous and sequential-move PD
games. Section six concludes.
2 Model
Consider the stage game shown below. To make this game a Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game, both
players￿payo⁄s must satisfy the restriction b > a > d > c. In that case, defect (D) becomes a
strictly dominant strategy and outcome (D,D) is the unique equilibrium of the one-shot stage game.
Player 2
C D
Player 1 C a,a c,b
D b,c d,d
We shall focus on the game played by players who possess Fehr and Schmidt (1999)-type social
preferences, a now standard speci￿cation which, for the case of two players, reduces to:
Ui(xi;xj) = xi ￿ ￿i maxfxj ￿ xi;0g ￿ ￿i maxfxi ￿ xj;0g;
6In this context, the uninformed player defects at every stage of the game, and therefore the informed player
cannot a⁄ect the uninformed player￿ s actions. This eliminates the possibility that information about the informed
player￿ s type can be conveyed to the uninformed player via signaling; see Kreps et al. (1982) page 251.
7Andreoni and Miller (1990) show experimental evidence supporting Kreps et al.￿ s (1982) theoretical predictions.
4where xi is player i￿ s payo⁄, and xj is the other player j￿ s payo⁄. Parameter ￿i represents the
disutility from allocations that are disadvantageously unequal for player i (i.e., due to envy about
player j￿ s higher payo⁄), while ￿i captures the disutility from allocations that are advantageously
unequal for player i (e.g., due to guilt over earning a higher payo⁄ than player j). Additionally,
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that envy concerns dominate guilt concerns, i.e., ￿i ￿ ￿i and
1 > ￿i ￿ 0.8 We shall contrast this case of ￿social preferences￿(alternatively described throughout
this paper as ￿concerns for fairness￿or ￿inequity aversion￿ ) with the more standard, self-regarding
or ￿sel￿sh￿preferences where ￿i = ￿i = 0 for all i. Introducing social preferences, the stage game
can be reformulated as follows:
Player 2
C D
Player 1 C a;a c ￿ ￿1(b ￿ c);b ￿ ￿2(b ￿ c)
D b ￿ ￿1(b ￿ c);c ￿ ￿2(b ￿ c) d,d
Notice that if player i￿ s concerns about guilt (fairness) are relatively low, ￿i < b￿a
b￿c, defection
becomes a strictly dominant strategy for player i. In contrast, if player i￿ s concern for fairness
is relatively high, ￿i ￿ b￿a
b￿c, his best response is to match player j￿ s action: cooperate when j
cooperates and defect otherwise.
3 Simultaneous-move game
In this section we brie￿ y analyze equilibrium predictions for the simultaneous-move Prisoner￿ s
Dilemma (PD) game under complete information about social preferences, in order to compare
them afterwards with equilibria under incomplete information. As shown in Du⁄y and Munoz-
Garcia (2010), if either (or both) players have relatively low concerns about guilt (equivalently,
low concerns for fairness), the unique Nash equilibrium of the game, (D,D), coincides with that
in games where players have no concerns about the fairness of the payo⁄ distribution (standard
preferences)￿see Figure 1 below. However, when both individuals are su¢ ciently concerned about
fairness (the shaded area of Figure 1), we can identify three di⁄erent Nash equilibria: one in which
both players defect, one in which both players cooperate, and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
where players randomize. The introduction of su¢ cient concerns about fairness for both players
then transforms the payo⁄ structure of the game from a Prisoner￿ s Dilemma to a Pareto-rankable
coordination game. In particular, every player￿ s best response is to select the same action as his
8Intuitively, ￿i ￿ ￿i implies that players (weakly) su⁄er more from inequality directed at them than inequality
directed at others. On the other hand, ￿i ￿ 0 means that players dislike being better o⁄ than others (this assumption
rules out cases in which individuals are status seekers but serves to simplify the analysis). Finally, ￿i < 1 suggests
that when player i￿ s payo⁄ is higher than that of player j￿ s by one unit (e.g. a dollar), player i is never willing to
give up more than one unit in order to reduce this inequality. For a more detailed explanation of these assumptions,
see Fehr and Schmidt (1999).






















Figure 1. Equilibria in the simultaneous
game under complete information.
3.1 Simultaneous-move game under incomplete information
This section examines how the introduction of incomplete information regarding players￿social
preferences a⁄ects equilibrium play in the simultaneous-move version of the game. In particular, we
consider the case where every player i knows his own preference parameters, ￿i;￿i, but is uncertain
of those for the other player j 6= i. We further suppose that the envy parameter ￿i is distributed
according to a commonly known cumulative distribution function F(￿i) with associated density
f(￿i) > 0 for all ￿i ￿ 0 for both players i = f1;2g. Similarly, the guilt parameter ￿i is assumed
to be distributed according to the commonly known cumulative distribution function G(￿i) with
associated density g(￿i) > 0 for all ￿i ￿ 0 for both individuals. For simplicity, we assume that
probability distributions over preferences are independent across players.10
As observed in the simultaneous move PD game under complete information, when a player￿ s
own concern about guilt is su¢ ciently low, ￿i < b￿a
b￿c, defection becomes a strictly dominant strategy
for him, for any concerns (preference parameters) of his opponent, (￿j;￿j). This same argument
is also applicable to the incomplete information game. By contrast, when a player￿ s own concerns
for fairness are su¢ ciently high, ￿i ￿ b￿a
b￿c, his decision to cooperate depends on the expectation he
forms about his opponent￿ s social preferences. In particular, player i cooperates when he is highly
9Note that this best response function is similar to what Cooper et al. (1996) call ￿best response altruists,￿namely
players for whom cooperate is their best response to cooperation, but defect is their best response to defection.
10The distribution of fairness concerns could be non-independent among individuals if, for instance, player i￿ s
observation of his own concern about fairness informs him about the conditional probability that his opponent￿ s
social preferences take values in a certain interval. In section 6 we discuss the implications of this possibility.
6concerned about fairness, ￿i > b￿a



































Intuitively, player i obtains a payo⁄ of a when both players cooperate, (C,C), which occurs
if player j is highly concerned about fairness, ￿j ￿ b￿a






. By contrast, player i experiences a disutility if he cooperates but his opponent defects,






. Speci￿cally, his payo⁄is only c￿￿i(b￿c), because of the envy he experiences in outcome
(C,D). If, instead, player i chooses to defect, then he might be the only player defecting￿outcome
(D,C)￿which occurs when player j is highly concerned about fairness; in this (D,C) outcome, player
i￿ s payo⁄ is b ￿ ￿i(b ￿ c), due to the the guilt that player i experiences. Finally, if both players












a ￿ b + ￿i(b ￿ c)
a + d ￿ b ￿ c + (￿i + ￿i)(b ￿ c)
￿ CSm (￿i;￿i) (Condition A)
where CSm denotes the cut-o⁄ for the simultaneous move PD game. Condition A is satis￿ed
for probability distributions G(￿j) that concentrate most of their weight on realizations above
￿j = b￿a










￿ 1 ￿ CSm (￿i;￿i).
Note further that CSm (￿i;￿i) is decreasing in ￿i and increasing13 in ￿i. Consequently, a low
concern about envy but a high concern about guilt raises the cuto⁄ CSm (￿i;￿i), thus making
cooperation more likely.14 We can now characterize the Bayesian equilibrium of this simultaneous-
move game with incomplete information.
Proposition 1. In the simultaneous PD game where players are privately informed about their
concerns for fairness, the following strategy pro￿le can be supported as pure strategy Bayesian Nash
equilibria of the game:
1. (C,C) if both players￿ concerns about fairness are su¢ ciently high, ￿i;￿j ￿ b￿a
b￿c, and the
probability distribution G(￿) satis￿es condition A;
11Note that if ￿j ￿
b￿a
b￿c then ￿j satis￿es ￿j >
b￿a
b￿c since ￿j ￿ ￿j by de￿nition. This is applicable in the ￿rst term
of both the left and right hand side of the above inequality. In the second term of both sides of the inequality we use
the property that defection becomes an strictly dominant strategy for player j when ￿j <
b￿a
b￿c, for any realization of
￿j.
12If a particular distribution function GA(￿j) satis￿es Condition A, then any distribution function GB(￿j) 6=
GA(￿j) that ￿rst-order stochastically dominates GA(￿j), i.e., GB(￿j) ￿ GA(￿j) for every ￿j, must also satisfy
Condition A.
13Note that C
Sm (￿i;￿i) is strictly positive for ￿i ￿
b￿a
b￿c, which is the case when examining player i￿ s decision
to cooperate or defect. (Recall that when ￿i <
b￿a
b￿c defection becomes a strictly dominant strategy.) Additionally,
C
Sm (￿i;￿i) is lower than one for any ￿i > 0 >
c￿d
b￿c, which is true by de￿nition.
14Note that assuming di⁄erent probability distributions over types for players i and j would make condition A











72. (C,D) if player i is relatively concerned about fairness but player j is not, ￿i ￿ b￿a
b￿c > ￿j,
and the probability distribution G(￿) satis￿es condition A. Similarly for (D,C).
3. (D,D) otherwise.
If Condition A is violated, the unique equilibrium outcome in the incomplete-information si-
multaneous move PD game, (D,D), coincides with that in the complete information version of that
game where one or both players are unconcerned about fairness. If Condition A is satis￿ed, however,
outcomes other than (D,D) can also be sustained as equilibria. Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium
possibilities in the simultaneous-move game under incomplete information when Condition A is
satis￿ed. First, when both players are su¢ ciently concerned about fairness, the introduction of
incomplete information in the stage game reduces the set of pure-strategy equilibria: from (C,C)
and (D,D) under complete information in Figure 1 to only (C,C) in Figure 2. Hence, incomplete in-


















Figure 2. Equilibria in the simultaneous
game under incomplete information.
When only one of the two players is highly concerned about fairness, then strategy pro￿les (C,D)
or (D,C) can be supported as equilibria as indicated by the dashed areas in Figure 2. Essentially,
under complete information, the highly-concerned player knows that he is dealing with an individual
with low concerns for fairness for whom defection is a strictly dominant strategy. This leads him
to also defect ￿ inducing outcome (D,D)￿ in order to avoid the disutility arising from envy in the
(C,D) outcome. In contrast, under incomplete information, the highly concerned player chooses to
cooperate only according to the prior probability that his opponent is also concerned. Hence, when
players￿concerns for fairness are relatively asymmetric, the introduction of incomplete information
can facilitate cooperation from the most concerned player.
84 Sequential-move game
In this section we investigate cooperation in the one-shot, sequential-move version of the PD game.
Under complete information, the second mover adopts a ￿reciprocal￿strategy (cooperating when
the ￿rst mover cooperates and defecting otherwise) if his own concern for fairness is su¢ ciently
high, ￿j ￿ b￿a
b￿c, but defects when his own concern for fairness is low.15;16 Given the second mover￿ s
response, the ￿rst mover chooses to cooperate when he anticipates that the second mover will
respond by cooperating, which occurs only if ￿j ￿ b￿a
b￿c. We summarize the equilibrium of this
sequential-move game under complete information in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. In the sequential-move PD game where players are informed about each others￿
social preference parameters, the following strategy pro￿le can be supported as the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game:
1. the ￿rst mover cooperates only if the second mover￿ s concerns for fairness are su¢ ciently
high, ￿j ￿ b￿a
b￿c, but defects otherwise; and
2. the second mover reciprocates if his concerns for fairness are su¢ ciently high, ￿j ￿ b￿a
b￿c, but
defects otherwise.
The equilibrium outcomes associated with di⁄erent preference parameters are represented in
Figure 3. The sequential time structure of the game therefore serves to support the cooperative
outcome (C,C) under a larger set of parameter values than in the simultaneous version of the
game (compare the shaded areas in Figures 3 and 1, respectively). In particular, cooperation can
be sustained in the sequential-move version as long as the second mover is su¢ ciently concerned
about fairness, ￿j > b￿a
b￿c, as Figure 3 illustrates below, unlike in the simultaneous game, where
such an outcome could only be sustained if both players￿fairness concerns are su¢ ciently high, i.e.,
￿i;￿j ￿ b￿a
b￿c.
15This best response function for the second mover resembles that of Falk and Fischbacher (2006). In particular,
assuming that individuals are perfectly informed about each others￿reciprocal motivations, they show that the second
mover might respond ￿matching￿the ￿rst mover￿ s choice if he is su¢ ciently reciprocally motivated. When he is not,
he responds to any action of the ￿rst mover with defection.
16Clark and Sefton (1998) provide an experimental test of this best response function. Speci￿cally, they modify the
payo⁄ structure in the sequential PD game so that the second mover can obtain a ￿temptation payo⁄￿if he is the
only player defecting. Note that this payo⁄ structure resembles ours, since payo⁄s associated to the (C,C) and (D,D)
outcomes are unmodi￿ed, relatively to the standard PD game, but those in which only the second mover defects
vary. In particular, they ￿nd that the second mover is more likely to respond to cooperation with cooperation as the
￿temptation payo⁄￿from defecting decreases. This experimental observation goes in line with our result, since the
second mover has more incentives to respond to cooperation with cooperation if his concerns for fairness are relatively
high (when the ￿temptation payo⁄￿from defecting decreases), but to respond defecting any choice of the ￿rst mover

















Figure 3. Equilibria in the sequential game
under complete information.
4.1 Sequential-move game under incomplete information
We now introduce incomplete information into the sequential-move PD game by considering the
case in which both players are privately informed about their own concerns for fairness and cannot
observe each other￿ s concerns. This situation arises in instances where players interact for the
￿rst time in a strategic setting that is novel to both of them. Notice that the second mover￿ s
best response still coincides with that described in Lemma 1, since it depends on his own social
preferences, and is independent of the ￿rst mover￿ s social preferences. The ￿rst mover, however,


























By cooperating, the ￿rst mover ￿say, player i￿obtains a payo⁄ of a when the second mover
responds with cooperation, but his payo⁄ is reduced to c￿￿i(b￿c) when the second mover, player
j, responds with defection. If, instead, the ￿rst mover chooses to defect, the second mover responds














(a ￿ c) + ￿i(b ￿ c)
￿ CSeq (￿i) (Condition B)
Similar to the simultaneous-move version of the PD game, when Condition B is satis￿ed, the
￿rst mover chooses to cooperate in the sequential version of the game as the probability distribution
17Note that cuto⁄ C
Seq (￿i) is lower than one for any ￿i > 0 >
c￿d
b￿c, which holds by de￿nition.
10G(￿j) concentrates most of its weight on relatively high values for ￿j, implying that the second
mover is most likely a reciprocating type. Cuto⁄ CSeq (￿i) depends upon the ￿rst mover￿ s envy
parameter, ￿i, but is independent of his guilt parameter, ￿i. Indeed, when the ￿rst mover chooses
to cooperate, he faces the risk that the second-mover is unconcerned about fairness and defects,
yielding a disutility to the ￿rst mover in the form of envy. If, instead, the ￿rst mover i decides to
defect, then the second mover j responds by defecting with certainty, regardless of j0s own fairness
concerns. This reciprocating response by the second mover eliminates the disutility from guilt
that the ￿rst mover would experience under (D,C), thus making CSeq (￿i) independent of the ￿rst
mover￿ s guilt parameter ￿i. Finally, note that the cuto⁄ CSeq (￿i) is decreasing in ￿i, making it
less likely that Condition B is satis￿ed. Intuitively, an increase in the ￿rst mover￿ s envy makes
cooperation more di¢ cult to sustain in the sequential-move game, which parallels our result for the
simultaneous version of the game. The next proposition describes equilibrium play in the sequential
game under incomplete information.
Proposition 2. In the sequential-move PD game where both players are privately informed
about their own concerns for fairness, the following strategy pro￿le can be supported as the pure
strategy PBE of the game:
1. The ￿rst mover cooperates if and only if Condition B holds; and
2. The second mover reciprocates if his concerns for fairness are su¢ ciently high, ￿j ￿ b￿a
b￿c, but
defects otherwise.
Similar to Condition A for the simultaneous-move game, both players in the sequential-move
game defect under all parameter values when Condition B is violated. When Condition B is
satis￿ed, however, the ￿rst mover cooperates under all parameter values, whereas the second mover
cooperates only when his own concern about fairness are su¢ ciently high. Figure 4 illustrates the
















Figure 4. Equilibria in the sequential game
under incomplete information.
Comparison with the game under complete information. Let us compare the last results,
as illustrated in Figure 4, with those for the sequential-move game under complete information, as
illustrated in Figure 3. When condition B holds, the cooperative outcome (C,C) can be supported
under the same parameters as in the complete information environment. Nonetheless, the partially
cooperative outcome (C,D) can be sustained under incomplete information provided that ￿j < b￿a
b￿c.
The latter outcome cannot be supported in the complete information version of the game.
Comparison with the simultaneous-move game. Suppose ￿rst that Conditions A and B
are simultaneously satis￿ed. In that case, the cooperative outcome (C,C) can be supported under a
larger set of social preference parameters in the sequential-move version than in the simultaneous-
move version of the incomplete information PD game. To see this, compare the shaded areas
of Figures 4 and 2, respectively.18 Similarly, the partially cooperative outcome, (C,D), can be
sustained in the sequential-move game when both players￿concerns for fairness are relatively low,
￿i;￿j < b￿a
b￿c, unlike in the simultaneous-move game, where only the non-cooperative outcome (D,D)
can be sustained. Suppose next that only Condition A (B) holds. In that case, cooperation can
only be sustained in the simultaneous-move game (only in the sequential-move game, respectively),
if both players are (the second mover is) highly concerned about fairness. Comparing Conditions




Therefore, for relatively low fairness concerns, ￿i < b￿d
b￿c, CSm (￿i;￿i) ￿ CSeq (￿i), making co-
operation more likely to occur in the sequential-move than in the simultaneous-move game, i.e.,
18Note that Conditions A and B are simultaneously satis￿ed when the probability of player j￿ s guilt being high,
i.e., ￿j ￿
b￿a
b￿c, is su¢ ciently large. Intuitively, this implies that player j is most likely a reciprocator with whom
player i plays the (C,C) outcome, both in the simultaneous and sequential-move game.
19This implies that relatively low concerns for fairness, ￿i <
b￿d



















￿ CSeq (￿i). By contrast, for su¢ ciently high concerns for fairness, ￿i ￿ b￿d
b￿c, we
obtain CSm (￿i;￿i) ￿ CSeq (￿i), and cooperation becomes more likely in the simultaneous￿ move
than in the sequential-move version of the incomplete information PD game. Intuitively, high con-
cerns about guilt raise cuto⁄ CSm (￿i;￿i) ￿ inducing player i to cooperate under larger parameter
conditions￿ but do not a⁄ect the value of CSeq (￿i), as described above. Hence, when player i￿ s
guilt concern is relatively high, i.e., ￿i ￿ b￿d
b￿c, player i￿ s cooperation becomes more likely in the
simultaneous than in the sequential version of the game. Otherwise, cooperation can be sustained
under a larger set of parameter values in the sequential-move game.
5 Signaling private concerns about fairness
In this section we examine the conditions under which a player can use his actions to reveal
his privately observed social preferences to other uninformed players with the aim of promoting
cooperation in subsequent periods. We also investigate conditions under which an informed player
with relatively low concerns for fairness might cooperate during the ￿rst period to ￿disguise￿himself
to his uniformed opponent as an individual highly concerned about fairness thereby inducing the
latter to cooperate while he takes the opportunity to defect. Speci￿cally, suppose that nature selects
player i￿ s concern for fairness, ￿i, and this information is revealed to player i alone. For simplicity




i with probability q, or
￿L
i with probability 1 ￿ q
for every player i = f1;2g, where ￿H
i > b￿a
b￿c > ￿L
i ￿ 0. We refer to a player i with ￿i = ￿H
i as the
￿concerned￿player and a player i with ￿i = ￿L
i as the ￿unconcerned￿player. Note that we allow
for ￿L
i = 0. By contrast, player j￿ s guilt parameter, ￿j, is perfectly observable by all players. In
order to focus on the possibility that player i signals his guilt concern to player j, let us further
assume that both individuals￿envy concerns, ￿i and ￿j, are common knowledge among the players.
Hence, player i holds private information about his guilt parameter alone, since the precise value




i , is common knowledge.
5.1 Twice-repeated simultaneous-move PD game
The timing of the twice-repeated ￿signaling￿ game is as follows. First, before any interaction
between the players, player i privately observes his social preferences, but the uniformed player j
does not (he only knows the prior probability distribution of ￿i). Then players play a simultaneous-
move PD game during the ￿rst period. After the game is played, payo⁄s are distributed among
players, which allows every player to infer the action that his opponent selected in the ￿rst stage
game. In particular, uninformed player j can use this information to update his beliefs about player
13i￿ s type. Given these beliefs, players play a second and ￿nal stage of the simultaneous move PD
game and payo⁄s are accrued.
Suppose further that player j is su¢ ciently concerned about fairness, i.e., ￿j ￿ b￿a
b￿c. If this
were not the case, then player j would ￿nd defection to be a strictly dominant strategy in the
second period simultaneous-move game, and the ￿rst-period player i￿ s actions would not have any
e⁄ect on player j￿ s future play. Since the game only involves two subsequent periods, we assume
no time discounting. Under these assumptions, the following proposition describes a separating
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of this signaling game where the player i cooperates (defects)
in the ￿rst-period stage game when his fairness concerns are high (low, respectively).20
Proposition 3. Suppose q <
d￿c+￿j(b￿c)
a+d￿c￿b+(￿j+￿j)(b￿c) ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j). Then there exists a separat-
ing PBE in which the informed player i cooperates in the ￿rst period when he is concerned about





b￿c . In the second
period, player i cooperates when he is concerned about fairness but defects otherwise. The unin-
formed but highly concerned player j defects in the ￿rst period and cooperates in the second period












In this strategy pro￿le, player i cooperates in the ￿rst period of the game only when his con-
cerns about fairness are su¢ ciently high. Note that a player i with high concerns for fairness will
cooperate in the ￿rst period despite knowing that the player j, (who is commonly known to be
highly concerned about fairness) will defect in the ￿rst period due to j￿ s low prior, q < qSim(￿j;￿j),
yielding an equilibrium outcome of (C,D), where player i￿ s payo⁄ is reduced to c ￿ ￿H
i (b ￿ c) due
to envy. Player i￿ s cooperation during the ￿rst stage communicates to the uninformed player j
that i￿ s concern for fairness is high (like player j￿ s) and consequently, both players will cooperate
in the second and ￿nal period.21 Hence, the highly concerned player i incurs a ￿rst-period envy
cost in order to reveal his type to player j. In return, he obtains a future bene￿t since he induces
the cooperative outcome (C,C) in the second and ￿nal period of the game.22 Two conditions must
hold for this separating equilibrium to be supported. First, a player i who is unconcerned with
fairness cannot have incentives to deviate towards cooperation in the ￿rst period in order to mimic
a highly-concerned player. In particular, the unconcerned player i does not deviate to cooperation
if the disutility from the envy he would bear during the ￿rst period (when the uninformed player j
defects), and the disutility from guilt he su⁄ers in the second period (when the uninformed player j
20Note that we use ￿separating￿ (￿pooling￿ ) equilibrium to refer to those strategy pro￿les in which the highly-
concerned player i (both types of player i, respectively) cooperate during the ￿rst-period game.
21When both players are highly concerned about fairness and player i￿ s high concerns are revealed to player j
through equilibrium play in the separating equilibrium, both (C,C) and (D,D) can be supported as equilibrium
outcomes in the second-period game, as described in Lemma 1. For simplicity, we assume that players can resort to
some coordination mechanism, such as social norms or a stochastic randomization, by which players coordinate in
the e¢ cient cooperative outcome (C,C).
22Note that if the informed player i discounts future payo⁄s, cooperative outcome (C,C) becomes less attractive
and the separating equilibrium can be sustained under more restrictive parameter conditions. A similar argument is
applicable to the pooling equilibrium we describe below.
14cooperates) is su¢ ciently high, i.e., if ￿L
i + ￿L
i ￿ c+b￿2d
b￿c . On the other hand, the concerned player
i cooperates in the ￿rst period, bearing a disutility from envy in order to convey his type to the
uninformed but highly concerned player j thereby convincing the player j to play the cooperative
outcome in the second period of the game. The concerned player i ￿nds this strategy pro￿table
only if the disutility from the envy he experiences in the ￿rst period (when his opponent defects)
is su¢ ciently small, i.e., if ￿H
i < a+c￿2d




b￿c only if 2a￿b > 2d￿c. The latter inequality is satis￿ed when the
bene￿t from promoting the cooperative outcome (C,C) in the second-period game and obtaining a
payo⁄ of a, is su¢ ciently high. Indeed, when that bene￿t is su¢ ciently high, player i cooperates
during the ￿rst period, as prescribed in the separating equilibrium. In contrast, when that bene￿t
is relatively small, player i prefers to avoid the ￿rst-period cost from envy and chooses to defect.
In the latter case, the separating equilibrium cannot be supported, and a pooling equilibria where
both types of player i defect becomes the only PBE in pure strategies that can be sustained in the
signaling game.
The following proposition describes a di⁄erent pooling equilibrium in which both types of player
i cooperate in the ￿rst-period stage game.23
Proposition 4. Suppose q > qSim(￿j;￿j). Then there exists a pooling PBE in which player i
cooperates in the ￿rst and second period when he is concerned about fairness, but cooperates only
in the ￿rst period when he is unconcerned about fairness. The uninformed player j cooperates in
the ￿rst period, but in the second period he cooperates if and only if player i cooperated in the ￿rst











In the cooperative pooling equilibrium both types of player i cooperate in the ￿rst period.
The uninformed player j cooperates in both the ￿rst period (given his relatively high prior, q)
and the second period, as long as he observes that player i cooperated in the ￿rst stage. Hence,
by cooperating in the ￿rst period, the highly concerned player i induces the outcome (C,C) in
the second period of the game, whereas the unconcerned player i defects so that the ￿nal period
outcome is (D,C). The latter ￿backstabbing￿behavior of the unconcerned player i is a commonly
observed outcome in the ￿nal period of experiments involving ￿nitely-repeated, simultaneous-move
Prisoner￿ s Dilemma games as found in the literature cited in the introduction. In particular, subjects
initially cooperate but choose to defect in the last period, even when their opponent cooperated
has cooperated in all prior periods.24
23For robustness, we show that both separating and pooling equilibria survive the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive
Criterion under all parameter values; see Appendix 1. That appendix also provides conditions under which the
￿non-cooperative￿pooling equilibrium ￿ where both types of player i defect in the ￿rst period￿ can be sustained
and and under which parameter values it survives the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion.
24Appendix 2 con￿rms that both the separating and the pooling equilibria identi￿ed in propositions 3 and 4 survive
Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion.
155.2 Twice-repeated sequential-move PD game
As suggested in the introduction, the above ￿backstabbing￿equilibrium in which the unconcerned
player disguises himself as a highly concerned player is similar to that found in Healy (2007).
Speci￿cally, in the context of a ￿nitely-repeated, sequential-move game (the gift-exchange game),
Healy shows that both types of workers, ￿sel￿sh￿and ￿reciprocators,￿respond to high wage o⁄ers
exerting high levels of e⁄ort, continuing to do so until the last periods of interaction, when sel￿sh
workers slack.25 To facilitate a comparison of our results with those of Healy (2007), we next
examine a twice-repeated game of incomplete information in which the stage game where players
interact is the sequential prisoner￿ s dilemma, rather than the simultaneous-move version studied
in the previous section. Here we suppose that the second mover is privately informed about his
concerns for fairness, either high, ￿H
2 ￿ b￿a
b￿c, or low, ￿L
2 < b￿a
b￿c, with probabilities q and 1 ￿ q,
respectively. By contrast the ￿rst mover￿ s high concern for fairness, ￿H
1 ￿ b￿a
b￿c, is assumed to be
common knowledge among players. Under these assumptions, the following proposition provides
conditions under which a cooperative pooling outcome can be a PBE.26
Proposition 5. Suppose q > qSeq (￿1) ￿
d￿c+￿1(b￿c)
a￿c+￿1(b￿c). Then there exists a pooling PBE in the
twice-repeated sequential-move PD game under incomplete information where:
1. The uninformed ￿rst mover cooperates in the ￿rst period but cooperates in the second period
only after observing that the second mover cooperated during the ￿rst-period game; otherwise











2. The informed second mover cooperates in the ￿rst period regardless of his type. In the second-
period game, the informed second mover cooperates (defects) when he is concerned (uncon-
cerned, respectively) about fairness.




Therefore, when players interact in the twice-repeated sequential-move PD game, the pooling
strategy pro￿le described in section 5.1 can be supported as a PBE by replacing cuto⁄qSim (￿1;￿1)
for qSeq (￿1). Hence, the cooperative pooling equilibrium can be sustained under a larger set of
parameter values in the simultaneous prisoner￿ s dilemma game as compared with the sequential
version, i.e., q > qSeq (￿1) > qSim (￿1;￿1), if the uninformed ￿rst mover is highly concerned about
fairness, i.e., ￿H
1 > b￿d
b￿c. Intuitively, when the ￿rst mover interacts in a sequential-move game, he
can anticipate that his defection will be responded to with defection by the second mover, regardless
of the second mover￿ s type, leading to a payo⁄of d. By contrast, in the simultaneous version of the
25In particular, this result corresponds to proposition 1 in Healy (2007) where the past actions of all players are
observable, but the workers￿types are not.
26This proposition compares the pooling equilibrium in the simultaneous and sequential versions of the signaling
game. Nonetheless, the proof shows that the separating equilibrium described in section 5.1 for the simultaneous PD
game can also be supported as a PBE of the sequential version of the game under similar parameter values.
16game, the informed player cannot sequentially respond to the uninformed player￿ s action, leading to
an expected payo⁄ of q[b￿￿H
1 (b￿c)]+(1￿q)d from playing defection. Therefore, the uninformed
player obtains a higher payo⁄ from playing defection in the sequential than in the simultaneous-
move game if his guilt feeling is substantial, i.e., if ￿H
1 ￿ b￿d
b￿c. Under this condition, defection
becomes more attractive in the sequential-move than in the simultaneous-move version of the game.
The cooperation that the pooling equilibrium prescribes, therefore, can only be sustained in the
sequential game if prior beliefs are relatively high, i.e., q > qSeq (￿1) > qSim (￿1;￿1). This result
yields the testable implication that cooperation is more easily sustained during the ￿rst periods of
a ￿nitely-repeated interaction if players are asked to interact in a simultaneous-move as opposed to
a sequential-move PD game as studied in Healy (2007). Furthermore, note that a given reduction
in the uninformed player￿ s envy, ￿1, produces a larger decrease in qSim (￿1;￿1) than in qSeq (￿1),
making the cooperative pooling equilibrium sustainable under a larger set of parameter conditions
in the simultaneous-move than in the sequential-move version of the game. If, in contrast, the




instead satisfy qSim (￿1;￿1) > qSeq (￿1), and the cooperative equilibrium can be sustained under
larger parameter conditions in the sequential than in the simultaneous-move game.27 This result
coincides with that of incomplete information games where all players are uninformed about each
others￿concerns for fairness. Hence, when ￿H
1 ￿ b￿d
b￿c holds, cooperation can be supported under
larger parameter values in the simultaneous than in the sequential version of the game, both when
all players are uninformed and when only one player is.
Changes in the informational structure. For comparison purposes, we examine equilib-
rium play in the sequential PD game where the player holding private information about social
preferences is switched, from the second to the ￿rst mover. The following corollary shows that
under this informational setting only the ￿cooperative￿pooling equilibrium can be supported.
Corollary 1. If players interact in a sequential-move PD game where the ￿rst mover is privately
informed about his concerns for fairness, only the pooling strategy pro￿le described in Proposition
5 can be supported as a PBE of the signaling game. Moreover, it can be sustained for all second











In particular, the uninformed player (second mover) can react to any deviation towards defection
of the ￿rst mover, both during the ￿rst and second period of the game, since he observes the ￿rst-
mover￿ s action before choosing his. This time structure, hence, protects the uninformed second
mover from any potential exploitation attempt of his opponent. This di⁄ers from the sequential
PD game analyzed in Proposition 5, where the uninformed player was the ￿rst mover. In that
27Note that a given equilibrium (either separating or pooling) can only be supported under the same parameter




b￿c. The results in this section can be
easily extended to continuous probability distributions, G(￿1), as described in sections 3 and 4. Note that under a






17context he could still be exploited by the second mover in the last period of the game.28
6 Conclusions
A large experimental literature has provided evidence that subjects appear to exhibit other-regarding
or ￿social￿preferences as opposed to the more standard self-regarding preferences that are typi-
cally assumed by theories. Social preferences have been formally modeled in an e⁄ort to explain
why experimental data often depart from equilibrium predictions. To date, all models of social
preferences have assumed that the players can perfectly observe one another￿ s social preference
parameters. This might be a reasonable assumption in strategic environments where players have
been interacting with one another for long periods of time, allowing their preference parameters to
be revealed through their prior action choices. Nonetheless, in contexts where such a long history
of play is not available, incomplete information regarding the social preferences of other players
seems a more reasonable assumption.
In this paper we examine how equilibrium play in the simultaneous and sequential-move Pris-
oner￿ s Dilemma game is a⁄ected by the introduction of incomplete information regarding players￿
social preferences. Our results are mainly evaluated according to two criteria: (1) whether the
e¢ cient cooperative outcome can be supported under larger sets of parameter values relative to the
complete information environment; and (2) whether the introduction of uncertainty helps select a
unique equilibrium outcome. We then investigate information transmission when players interact
in a twice-repeated simultaneous prisoner￿ s dilemma game. A separating equilibrium can be sup-
ported in which a player with high concerns about fairness bears the cost of cooperating in order
to reveal his type to his uniformed opponent, thus promoting cooperation in subsequent periods.
We also identify a pooling equilibrium in which a player unconcerned about inequity aversion ini-
tially cooperates in order to mislead the uninformed player. Speci￿cally, this misleading strategy
induces the uninformed player to cooperate in the subsequent game, when the unconcerned player
takes the opportunity to defect, yielding outcome (D,C). This ￿backstabbing￿equilibrium might
explain subjects￿￿end-game￿behavior where they behave non-cooperatively in the ￿nal play of ex-
perimental games such as Prisoner￿ s Dilemma. We also demonstrate that this type of equilibrium
can be supported in the sequential version of the stage game, although under di⁄erent parameter
conditions. This helps us compare our results with those in the literature and predict which version
of the game can sustain cooperation under a larger set of parameter values.
In this paper we assume that players￿social preferences are independently distributed. This
assumption, however, can be relaxed if every individual￿ s private concerns about fairness informs
him about the conditional probability that his opponent￿ s social preferences take values in a cer-





in conditions A and B, every player i could consider
28Note that, in the context of the simultaneous PD game, our equilibrium results in section 5.1 would not be
a⁄ected if we modify which player holds private information about his social preferences, either player i or j, since
our results in those propositions are valid for any player i = f1;2g and j 6= i.





, i.e., the probability that his opponent is relatively con-











then cooperation is more likely to be sustained relative to the case where players￿social prefer-
ences are independently distributed. Intuitively, by observing ￿i; player i can infer that player j￿ s
concerns are relatively high, making player i more likely to cooperate than when social concerns












For compactness, we focus on a game ￿the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma￿with strong competitive pres-
sures, where the con￿ ict between individual and social preferences is intense. Nonetheless, our
analysis can be directly applied to other strategic environments where social preferences have been
extensively studied, such as coordination and anti-coordination games. This would provide a bet-
ter understanding of whether incomplete information about concerns for fairness induces more
cooperation and how agents use their actions to reveal or conceal their social preferences to other
players.
7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix 1 - Noncooperative pooling equilibria
Proposition A. A pooling PBE can be sustained in which player i defects in the ￿rst period both
when he is concerned about fairness and when he is not, and:
a. Player i defects in the second period, both when he is concerned about fairness and when
he is not. The uninformed player j defects in the ￿rst and second period, regardless of












b. Player i defects in the second period when he is unconcerned about fairness, but cooperates in





b￿c . The uninformed player j
defects in the ￿rst period. In the second period player j defects after observing that player i de-












c. Player i defects in the second period when he is concerned about fairness, but cooperates in
equilibrium otherwise given ￿i ￿ b￿d
b￿c. The uninformed player j cooperates in the ￿rst period.
In the second period, player j cooperates after observing that player i defects in the ￿rst period











19Proof. Let us investigate the pooling equilibrium in which both types of informed player i
defect in the ￿rst period of the game. First, note that after observing an action from player i in the
￿rst period, player j￿ s beliefs in this pooling equilibrium are ￿(￿H
i jC) ￿ ￿ 2 [0;1] and ￿(￿H
i jD) = q.
Given these beliefs, let us now analyze player j￿ s best response during the second period of the
game. In particular, after observing D in the ￿rst period (in equilibrium), player j cannot infer
player i￿ s social preferences and must therefore make her second period choice according to an
expected utility comparison. In particular, player j cooperates in the second period if
qa + (1 ￿ q)[c ￿ ￿j(b ￿ c)] ￿ q[b ￿ ￿j(b ￿ c)] + (1 ￿ q)d:
That is, if q ￿
d￿c+￿j(b￿c)
a+d￿c￿b+(￿j+￿j)(b￿c) ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j). Note that this cuto⁄ strategy coincides with
the one player j uses when selecting between C and D at the beginning of the ￿rst period. After
observing C in the ￿rst period (o⁄-the-equilibrium) player j cannot infer player i￿ s social preferences
either, and must therefore choose C or D in the second period according to an expected utility
comparison. Speci￿cally, player j cooperates in the second period if and only if
￿a + (1 ￿ ￿)[c ￿ ￿j(b ￿ c)] ￿ ￿[b ￿ ￿j(b ￿ c)] + (1 ￿ ￿)d:
That is, if ￿ ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j). Let us now investigate the informed player i￿ s actions during the ￿rst
period:
1. If q;￿ ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j) player j cooperates in the ￿rst period of the game, as well as in the
second period, both after observing that player i selects C and D. The highly concerned
player i cooperates given that a + a ￿ b ￿ ￿H
i (b ￿ c) + a, which holds since ￿H
i ￿ b￿a
b￿c by
de￿nition. Hence, the prescribed strategy pro￿le cannot be supported as a pooling PBE if
q;￿ ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j).
2. If q;￿ < qSim(￿j;￿j) player j defects in the ￿rst period of the game, as well as in the second
period, both after observing that player i selects C and D. On the one hand, the highly
concerned player i defects if c￿￿H
i (b￿c)+d ￿ d+d, which implies ￿H
i ￿ 0 > c￿d
b￿c, which holds
by de￿nition. On the other hand, the unconcerned player i defects if c￿￿L
i (b￿c)+d ￿ d+d,
which implies ￿L
i ￿ 0 > c￿d
b￿c, which also holds by de￿nition. Therefore, this pooling strategy
pro￿le can be sustained as a PBE if q;￿ < qSim(￿j;￿j).
3. If q ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j) > ￿ player j cooperates in the ￿rst period of the game, as well as in the
second period but only if he observes that player i chose D in the ￿rst period. On the one
hand, the highly concerned player i defects if a + d ￿ b ￿ ￿H






b￿c. On the other hand, the unconcerned player i defects
if a + d ￿ b ￿ ￿L
i (b ￿ c) + b ￿ ￿L
i (b ￿ c), which holds if ￿L
i < 2b￿a￿d








b￿c and q ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j) > ￿.
204. If q < qSim(￿j;￿j) ￿ ￿ player j defects in the ￿rst period of the game, as well as in the second
period but only if he observes that player i chose C in the ￿rst period. On the one hand, the
informed highly concerned player i defects if c￿￿H





b￿c if (b ￿ c) < 2(a ￿ d). On the other hand, the unconcerned player i defects if
c￿￿L
i (b￿c)+b￿￿L
i (b￿c) ￿ d+d, or ￿L
i +￿L
i ￿ c+b￿2d
b￿c . Therefore, the prescribed strategy
pro￿le can be sustained as a pooling PBE if q < qSim(￿j;￿j) ￿ ￿, the social preference
parameters of the highly concerned player i satisfy ￿H
i ￿ a+c￿2d
b￿c and those of the relatively




In the pooling equilibrium in which both types of player i defect (part a of Proposition A),
the uninformed player j￿ s beliefs are so ￿pessimistic￿that he chooses to defect in the second stage
of the game, regardless of player i￿ s choices in the ￿rst period. Consequently, player i defects,
both when he is concerned and when he is unconcerned about fairness. The strategy pro￿le in
part (b) describes a similar pooling equilibrium as that in part (a), but in which player j￿ s o⁄-the-
equilibrium-path beliefs are su¢ ciently high to induce him to cooperate after observing cooperation.
Thus, player i￿ s choice induces player j to cooperate after observing cooperation but to defect
otherwise. Consequently, deviating towards cooperation becomes a more attractive option than in
part (a), where all actions are responded to with defection in the second period. In order to support
the pooling equilibrium where both types of player i defect, the gain that player i obtains from
second period cooperation cannot o⁄set the disutility from envy experienced from cooperating in the





b￿c . Finally, in
the pooling equilibrium described in part (c), the uninformed player j interprets a deviation towards






which are rather ￿insensible￿o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs. Appendix 2 below con￿rms this suspicion
by showing that the pooling equilibrium in part (c) does not survive the Cho and Kreps￿(1987)
Intuitive Criterion. By contrast, we demonstrate that all other equilibria do survive this re￿nement
criterion under relatively large parameter conditions.
7.2 Appendix 2 - Equilibrium re￿nement
Lemma A. All PBEs described in Propositions 3-4 survive Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Cri-
terion under all parameter values. All PBEs in Proposition A (Appendix 1) also survive the Intu-
itive Criterion, except for the pooling equilibrium described in part (c) under all parameter values,







Proof. Proposition 3. In the separating PBE of the game no action by the informed player i
is regarded as o⁄-the-equilibrium since all actions are used by some type of player i with positive
probability i.e., cooperation is selected by the highly concerned player i while defection is chosen
21by the unconcerned type of player i. The uninformed player j does not sustain o⁄-the-equilibrium
beliefs to be restricted using the Cho and Kreps￿Intuitive Criterion. Therefore, the separating
PBE survives the Intuitive Criterion.
Proposition 4. Let us ￿rst check the pooling PBE where both types of player i cooperate in
the ￿rst period under q ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j). Regarding the unconcerned player i, if he deviates towards
defection, the highest payo⁄ he can obtain is b ￿ ￿L
i (b ￿ c) + b ￿ ￿L
i (b ￿ c), which exceeds his
equilibrium payo⁄ of a + b ￿ ￿L
i (b ￿ c). Regarding the highly concerned player i, if he deviates to
defection, the highest payo⁄ he can obtain is a + a, which coincides with his equilibrium payo⁄
from cooperating. Hence only the unconcerned player i has incentives to deviate towards defection,
allowing the uninformed player j to restrict his posterior beliefs to ￿(￿H
i jD) = 0. Given these
beliefs, player j defects in the second period after observing defection (since it can only come from
an unconcerned player i), yielding a total payo⁄ for the unconcerned player i of b ￿ ￿L
i (b ￿ c) + d,
which does not exceed his equilibrium payo⁄ given that a + b ￿ ￿L
i (b ￿ c) ￿ b ￿ ￿L
i (b ￿ c) + d
since a ￿ d. Hence no type of player i wants to deviate from the pooling PBE where both types
cooperate, and therefore this pooling equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion.
Proposition A, part a. Let us now check whether the pooling equilibrium in which both types
of player i defect under q;￿ < qSim(￿j;￿j) survives the Intuitive Criterion. Regarding the highly
concerned player i, if he deviates towards cooperation the highest payo⁄ he can obtain is c ￿
￿H
i (b￿c)+a, which exceeds his equilibrium payo⁄ of d+d if ￿H
i < a+c￿2d
b￿c . [Recall that condition
￿H
i < a+c￿2d
b￿c is compatible with ￿H
i ￿ b￿a
b￿c if b￿c < 2(a￿d)]. Regarding the unconcerned player i,
if he deviates towards cooperation the highest payo⁄ he can obtain is c￿￿L
i (b￿c)+b￿￿L
i (b￿c),
which exceeds his equilibrium payo⁄ of d + d only if ￿L
i + ￿L
i < c+b￿2d
b￿c . Using the conditions we
found for the concerned and unconcerned player i, let us examine under which cases this pooling
equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion:





b￿c hold, both types of player i have incentives
to deviate, and the uninformed player j cannot restrict his o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs.
As a consequence, no type of player i has incentives to modify his equilibrium action, and
hence this pooling equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion.
2. When condition ￿H
i < a+c￿2d
b￿c holds but ￿L
i + ￿L
i < c+b￿2d
b￿c does not, the concerned player
i has incentives to deviate towards cooperation but the unconcerned does not. Hence, the
uninformed player j restricts his beliefs to ￿(￿H
i jC) = 1 and ￿(￿H
i jD) = 0, and cooperates
in the second period after observing C but defects after observing D. Given this response by
player j during the second period of the game, the highly concerned player i has incentives to
cooperate in the ￿rst period since he obtains c￿￿L
i (b￿c)+a, which exceeds his equilibrium
payo⁄ of d + d, given that ￿H
i < a+c￿2d
b￿c holds. Hence the pooling PBE where both players












b￿c hold, then neither type of player
22i has incentives to deviate. Consequently, the uninformed player j cannot restrict his o⁄-
the-equilibrium-path beliefs, and no type of player i has incentives to change his equilibrium
action. Therefore, this pooling equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion.
4. When condition ￿H
i < a+c￿2d
b￿c does not hold but ￿L
i +￿L
i < c+b￿2d
b￿c does, the concerned player
i does not have incentives to deviate towards cooperation but the unconcerned player i does.
Therefore, the uninformed player j restricts his o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs to ￿(￿H
i jC) = 0 and
￿(￿H
i jD) = 1, since cooperation can only come from the unconcerned player i. Consequently,
player j cooperates in the second period after observing D but defects after observing C.
Given this response by player j, the highly concerned player i does not have incentives to
deviate towards cooperation since he would obtain c ￿ ￿H
i (b ￿ c) + d, which does not exceed
his equilibrium payo⁄of d+d. Similarly, the unconcerned player i does not have incentives to
deviate towards cooperation, since he would obtain c￿￿L
i (b￿c)+d, which is lower than his
equilibrium payo⁄of d+d. Hence the pooling PBE in which both types of player i defect when






Proposition A, part b. Let us now examine the pooling equilibrium in which both types of player
i defect under ￿ ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j) > q. Regarding the highly concerned player i, if he deviates towards
cooperation the highest payo⁄ he can obtain is c + ￿H
i (b ￿ c) + a, which exceeds his equilibrium
payo⁄ of d + d only if ￿H
i < a+c￿2d
b￿c , which violates the equilibrium conditions. Hence, the highly
concerned player i does not have incentives to deviate. Regarding the unconcerned player i, if he
deviates towards cooperation the highest payo⁄he can obtain is c+￿L
i (b￿c)+b￿￿L
i (b￿c), which
exceeds his equilibrium payo⁄ of d + d only if ￿L
i + ￿L
i < c+b￿2d
b￿c , which violates the equilibrium
conditions. Therefore, the unconcerned player i does not deviate towards cooperation either. Since
no type of player i deviates from his equilibrium action, player j￿ s posterior beliefs are unmodi￿ed,
and this pooling PBE survives the Intuitive Criterion if ￿ > qSim(￿j;￿j) > q.
Proposition A, part c. Let us ￿nally examine the pooling equilibrium in which both types of
player i defect under q ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j) > ￿. Regarding the highly concerned player i, if he deviates
towards cooperation, the highest payo⁄ he can obtain is a + a, which exceeds his equilibrium
payo⁄ of b ￿ ￿H
i (b ￿ c) + a since ￿H
i > b￿a
b￿c by de￿nition. Hence, the highly concerned player has
incentives to deviate. Regarding the unconcerned player i, if he deviates towards cooperation, the
highest payo⁄s he can achieve is a+b￿￿L
i (b￿c), which does not exceed his equilibrium payo⁄ of
b￿￿L
i (b￿c)+b￿￿L
i (b￿c) since ￿L
i < b￿a
b￿c. Therefore, only the concerned player i has incentives
to deviate towards cooperation. Hence, the uninformed player j can restrict his o⁄-the-equilibrium
beliefs after observing cooperation to ￿(￿H
i jC) = 1, inducing him to cooperate in the second period
game as a consequence. Thus, the concerned player i obtains a higher payo⁄ by deviating from his
equilibrium action of defection towards cooperation, and consequently the pooling equilibrium in
which both types of player i defect under q ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j) > ￿ violates the Intuitive Criterion. ￿
Starting from the pooling equilibrium in which both types of player i defect, described in
Proposition A(c), the highly concerned player i can ￿separate￿ from the unconcerned type by
23deviating towards cooperation. This allows the uninformed player j to assign full probability to
player i being concerned (unconcerned) after observing cooperation (defection, respectively). Player
j hence cooperates after observing cooperation from player i but defects otherwise. Given these
updated beliefs for the uninformed player, the highly concerned player i cooperates during the ￿rst
period, violating the pooling equilibrium in which both types of player i defect.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
First, note that when ￿i < b￿a
b￿c;defection becomes a strictly dominant strategy for player i regardless
of player j￿ s social preferences. In contrast, when ￿i ￿ b￿a
b￿c; defection is not a strictly dominant





satis￿es condition A. If condition A holds and
both players￿concerns satisfy ￿i;￿j ￿ b￿a
b￿c, then they both cooperate and (C,C) is the unique
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game. If both players are concerned but condition A is violated,
then they both defect, yielding outcome (D,D) as the unique equilibrium. If condition A is satis￿ed
but only one player is relatively concerned about fairness, then he is the only player cooperating,
yielding either outcome (C,D) or (D,C). If only one player is relatively concerned but condition
A does not hold, then (D,D) is the unique equilibrium of the game. Finally, if both players are
relatively concerned, ￿i;￿j < b￿a
b￿c, then outcome (D,D) can be supported as the unique Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the game. ￿
7.4 Proof of Lemma 1
From the text we know that the second mover best response is to select the same action as the ￿rst
mover when ￿j ￿ b￿a
b￿c, but to defect when ￿j < b￿a
b￿c, regardless of the action selected by the ￿rst




C if ai = C and ￿j ￿ b￿a
b￿c; and
D otherwise
When the second mover￿ s concerns about fairness satisfy ￿j ￿ b￿a
b￿c, the second mover responds
by selecting the action selected by the ￿rst mover. Therefore, the ￿rst mover￿ s payo⁄ from coop-
erating (which is responded with cooperation) is a, while that from defecting (which is responded
with defection) is d. Since a > d by de￿nition, the ￿rst mover prefers to cooperate when the second
mover￿ s concerns about fairness satisfy ￿j ￿ b￿a
b￿c, for any preference parameters of the ￿rst mover.
When instead the second mover￿ s concerns satisfy ￿j < b￿a
b￿c, the second mover responds by
defecting, regardless of the action previously selected by the ￿rst mover. Under this case, if the
￿rst mover selects cooperation his payo⁄ is c ￿ ￿i(b ￿ c), while if he defects his payo⁄ is d. Since
c ￿ ￿i(b ￿ c) < d for any ￿i ￿ 0, the ￿rst mover defects when the second mover￿ s concerns satisfy
￿j < b￿a
b￿c. ￿
247.5 Proof of Proposition 2
The second mover￿ s best response function coincides with that in Lemma 1. Regarding the ￿rst
mover, he cooperates if condition B holds, given that he is uninformed about the second mover￿ s
concern for fairness. Hence, if condition B holds, the ￿rst mover cooperates, which triggers a
cooperative response from the second mover if ￿j > b￿a
b￿c, yielding outcome (C,C). If condition B
holds but ￿j < b￿a
b￿c, then the ￿rst mover is the only cooperator, yielding outcome (C,D). Finally,
if condition B is not satis￿ed, the ￿rst mover defects and the second mover responds by defecting,
regardless of his concern for fairness, yielding outcome (D,D). ￿
7.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Let us ￿rst analyze the separating equilibrium in which the highly concerned player i cooperates
but the unconcerned player i defects. First, note that after observing an action from player i in the
￿rst period of the game, player j￿ s beliefs in this separating equilibrium are updated to ￿(￿H
i jC) = 1
and ￿(￿H
i jD) = 0. Given these beliefs, let us now analyze player j￿ s best response in the second
period of the game. In particular, after observing C in the ￿rst period, the uninformed player j
believes that his opponent, i; is a highly concerned type (so that i will continue to select C). Since
j is assumed to be highly concerned about fairness, ￿j > b￿a
b￿c; it follows that a > b ￿ ￿j(b ￿ c)
and so the uninformed player j will choose to cooperate in the second period of game. However,
after observing a D in the ￿rst period, the uninformed player j believes that his opponent i is an
unconcerned type who will choose D. Given that d > c ￿ ￿j(b ￿ c) by de￿nition, the uninformed
player j will choose to defect in the second period of the game. Let us now examine the ￿rst
period of the game. In the ￿rst period, the uninformed player j, must select C or D based upon an
expected utility comparison; speci￿cally, j cooperates in the ￿rst period of the twice repeated PD
game if and only if:
qa + (1 ￿ q)[c ￿ ￿j(b ￿ c)] ￿ q[b ￿ ￿j(b ￿ c)] + (1 ￿ q)d:
That is, if q ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j). Let us now investigate the informed player i￿ s action during the
￿rst-period game:
1. If q > qSim(￿j;￿j), the uninformed player j cooperates during the ￿rst period. On the
one hand, the informed, highly concerned player i thus cooperates if a + a ￿ b ￿ ￿H
i (b ￿
c) + d, since defection is responded to with defection in the subsequent period. That is, if
￿H
i ￿ b￿d￿2a
b￿c . And since ￿H
i > b￿a
b￿c > b￿d￿2a
b￿c , the above condition is satis￿ed and therefore
the informed, highly concerned player i cooperates in the ￿rst period, as prescribed in this
separating equilibrium. On the other hand, the informed, unconcerned player i cooperates
if a + [b ￿ ￿L
i (b ￿ c)] ￿ [b ￿ ￿L
i (b ￿ c)] + d, i.e., a ￿ d. Hence the unconcerned player i also
cooperates in the ￿rst period, which violates the prescribed strategy pro￿le in this separating
equilibrium.
252. If q < qSim(￿j;￿j), the uninformed player j defects during the ￿rst period. On the one hand,
the informed, highly concerned player i cooperates if c￿￿H
i (b￿c)+a ￿ d+d, or ￿H
i ￿ a+c￿2d
b￿c ;
note that this cuto⁄is higher than b￿a
b￿c if and only if b￿c < 2(a￿d). On the other hand, the
informed, unconcerned player i defects since c￿￿L
i (b￿c)+c￿￿L
i (b￿c) ￿ d+d, given that
this implies c￿d
b￿c ￿ ￿L
i , which is true by de￿nition. We therefore can support a separating
equilibrium in which player i cooperates if and only if he is highly concerned about fairness
if the prior probability q satis￿es q < qSim(￿j;￿j) and envy satis￿es ￿H
i ￿ a+c￿2d
b￿c .
Let us now analyze the separating equilibrium in which the highly concerned player i defects
but the unconcerned player i cooperates. First, note that after observing an action from player i in
the ￿rst-period game, player j￿ s beliefs in this separating equilibrium are updated to ￿(￿H
i jC) = 0
and ￿(￿H
i jD) = 1. Given these beliefs, let us now analyze player j￿ s best response during the
second period game. In particular, after observing C in ￿rst period, he believes that his opponent
is unconcerned (according to the strategy pro￿le prescribed in this separating equilibrium), and
hence his opponent will not cooperate in the second-period game. Player j defects as a consequence
in the second-period PD game since d > c￿￿j(b￿c). After observing D in the ￿rst period, player
j believes that his opponent is highly concerned, and that hence his opponent will cooperate in the
second period. Therefore, player j cooperates in the second period since a > b ￿ ￿j(b ￿ c) given
that ￿j > b￿a
b￿c by de￿nition. Let us now examine the ￿rst-period game. Regarding the uninformed
player j, he must choose C or D according to an expected utility calculation. In particular, player
j cooperates during the ￿rst-period PD game if and only if
q[c ￿ ￿j(b ￿ c)] + (1 ￿ q)a ￿ qd + (1 ￿ q)[b ￿ ￿j(b ￿ c)]
That is, if q ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j). Let us now investigate the informed player i￿ s actions during the
￿rst-period game:
1. If q > qSim(￿j;￿j), the uninformed player j cooperates during the ￿rst period. On the one










b￿c. On the other hand, the unconcerned player i cooperates (as prescribed) if
a + d ￿ b ￿ ￿H
i (b ￿ c) + b ￿ ￿H
i (b ￿ c) which implies ￿L
i > 2b￿a￿d





b￿c. Hence, this separating strategy pro￿le cannot be sustained if
q > qSim(￿j;￿j).
2. If q < qSim(￿j;￿j), the uninformed player j defects during the ￿rst period. On the one
hand, the informed highly concerned player i cooperates if c ￿ ￿H
i (b ￿ c) + d ￿ d + a, or
c￿a
b￿c < 0 ￿ ￿H
i , which is true by de￿nition. On the other hand, the informed unconcerned
player i defects since c ￿ ￿L
i (b ￿ c) + d ￿ d + b ￿ ￿L
i (b ￿ c), or (b ￿ c)(￿L
i ￿ ￿L
i ) ￿ (b ￿ c),
which can only hold if ￿L
i ￿ ￿L
i , which is false by de￿nition. Hence, this separating strategy
pro￿le cannot be supported if q < qSim(￿j;￿j). ￿
267.7 Proof of Proposition 4
Let us analyze the pooling equilibrium where both types of informed player i cooperate in the ￿rst
period of the game. First, note that after observing an action from player i in the ￿rst period, player
j￿ s beliefs in this pooling equilibrium are ￿(￿H
i jC) = q (in equilibrium) and ￿(￿H
i jD) ￿ ￿ 2 [0;1]
(o⁄-the-equilibrium path). Given these beliefs, let us now analyze player j￿ s best response during
the second period of the game. In particular, after observing C in the ￿rst period (in equilibrium)
player j cannot infer player i￿ s social preferences and must therefore select C or D in the second
period according to an expected utility comparison. In particular, player j cooperates in the
second-period game if and only if
qa + (1 ￿ q)[c ￿ ￿j(b ￿ c)] ￿ q[b ￿ ￿j(b ￿ c)] + (1 ￿ q)d:
That is, if q ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j). Note that this cuto⁄ strategy coincides with the one that player j
uses when selecting between C and D prior to playing the ￿rst period of the game. After observing
D in the ￿rst period (o⁄-the-equilibrium) player j cannot infer player i￿ s social preferences either,
and must therefore select C or D in the second period of the game according to an expected utility
comparison. Speci￿cally, player j cooperates in the second period if and only if
￿a + (1 ￿ ￿)[c ￿ ￿j(b ￿ c)] ￿ ￿[b ￿ ￿j(b ￿ c)] + (1 ￿ ￿)d:
That is, if ￿ ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j). Let us now investigate the informed player i￿ s actions during in the
￿rst period of the game:
1. If q;￿ ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j) player j cooperates in both the ￿rst and second periods of the game,
both after observing that player i selects C and D. On the one hand, the highly concerned
player i cooperates if a + a ￿ b ￿ ￿H
i (b ￿ c) + a, which holds since ￿H
i ￿ b￿a
b￿c. On the other
hand, the unconcerned player i defects since a+b￿￿L
i (b￿c) ￿ b￿￿L
i (b￿c)+b￿￿L
i (b￿c),
which holds since ￿L
i < b￿a
b￿c. Therefore, this pooling strategy pro￿le cannot be supported if
q;￿ > qSim(￿j;￿j).
2. If q;￿ < qSim(￿j;￿j) player j defects both in the ￿rst and second periods of the game, both
after observing that player i selects C and D.. The highly concerned player i defects, however,
since c ￿ ￿H
i (b ￿ c) + d ￿ d + d, which implies ￿H
i ￿ 0 ￿ c￿d
b￿c, which holds by de￿nition.
Hence, this pooling strategy pro￿le cannot be sustained if q;￿ < qSim(￿j;￿j).
3. If q ￿ qSim(￿j;￿j) > ￿ player j cooperates in the ￿rst period of the game and in the second
period he cooperates only after observing a C in the ￿rst period. On the one hand, the highly
concerned player i cooperates since a + a ￿ b ￿ ￿H
i (b ￿ c) + d, or ￿H
i ￿ b+d￿2a
b￿c . Given that
b￿a
b￿c > b+d￿2a
b￿c , then condition ￿H
i ￿ b+d￿2a
b￿c is satis￿ed from ￿H
i ￿ b￿a
b￿c. On the other hand,
the unconcerned player i cooperates since a + b ￿ ￿L
i (b ￿ c) ￿ b ￿ ￿L
i (b ￿ c) + d, or a ￿ d.
Hence this pooling strategy pro￿le can be supported as a PBE for q > qSim(￿j;￿j) > ￿.
274. If q < qSim(￿j;￿j) ￿ ￿ player j defects in the ￿rst period of the game and in the second
period he defects only after observing C. The highly concerned player i defects, however, since
c￿￿H
i (b￿c)+a ￿ d+a, which implies ￿H
i ￿ 0 ￿ c￿d
b￿c which is satis￿ed by de￿nition. Thus,
this pooling strategy pro￿le cannot be sustained if q < qSim(￿j;￿j) < ￿. ￿
7.8 Proof of Proposition 5
Separating PBE. Let us ￿rst analyze the separating equilibrium where the second mover co-
operates when being concerned but defects otherwise. First, note that after observing an action
from the second mover in the ￿rst-period game, the ￿rst mover￿ s beliefs about ￿H
2 are updated
according to Bayes rule and become ￿(￿H
2 jC) = 1 and ￿(￿H
2 jD) = 0. Given these beliefs, the ￿rst
mover cooperates in the second period after observing that the second mover cooperated in the ￿rst
period, but defects otherwise. After these choices, the second mover reciprocates the ￿rst mover in
the second-period game if the second mover is concerned, or defects otherwise.
During the ￿rst period, the second mover cooperates when being concerned but defects oth-
erwise, as prescribed. Hence, the ￿rst mover cooperates if the expected utility from cooperation
exceeds that from defection. That is,
qa + (1 ￿ q)[c ￿ ￿1(b ￿ c)] ￿ qd + (1 ￿ q)d
or q ￿ qSeq(￿1). Let us ￿nally investigate the second mover￿ s action during the ￿rst-period game:
1. If q ￿ qSeq(￿1), the ￿rst mover cooperates in the ￿rst-period game. On one hand, the
concerned second mover cooperates if a+a ￿ b￿￿H
2 (b￿c)+d, since defection is responded with
defection in the subsequent period. That is, if ￿H
2 ￿ b￿d￿2a




by de￿nition, the above condition holds. Therefore the concerned second mover cooperates
in the ￿rst period, as prescribed in this separating equilibrium. On the other hand, the
unconcerned second mover defects if a+[b￿￿L
2(b￿c)] < [b￿￿L
2(b￿c)]+d, i.e., a < d, which
violates our initial assumptions. Hence the unconcerned second mover also cooperates in the
￿rst period, which violates the prescribed strategy pro￿le in this separating equilibrium.
2. If q < qSeq(￿1), the ￿rst mover defects in the ￿rst-period game. On one hand, the concerned
second mover cooperates if c ￿ ￿H
2 (b ￿ c) + a ￿ d + d, or ￿H
2 ￿ a+c￿2d
b￿c . On the other hand,
the unconcerned second mover defects if c ￿ ￿L
2(b ￿ c) + b ￿ ￿L




2. We therefore can support a separating equilibrium in which the second
mover cooperates only when he is concerned about fairness if the ￿rst-mover￿ s beliefs satisfy






Pooling PBE. Let us now analyze the pooling equilibrium where both types of second mover
cooperate in the ￿rst-period game. First, note that after observing an action from the second
mover during the ￿rst period, ￿rst mover￿ s beliefs about ￿H
2 in this pooling equilibrium cannot
28updated using Bayes￿rule and hence are ￿(￿H
2 jC) = q (in equilibrium) and ￿(￿H
2 jD) ￿ ￿ 2 [0;1]
(o⁄-the-equilibrium path). Given these beliefs, the ￿rst mover cooperates in the second period after
observing that the second mover chose C (in equilibrium) in the ￿rst period if q ￿ qSeq(￿1). If the
￿rst mover observes the second mover selecting D in the ￿rst period (o⁄-the-equilibrium), then the
￿rst mover cooperates in the second-period game if and only if
￿a + (1 ￿ ￿)[c ￿ ￿1(b ￿ c)] ￿ ￿d + (1 ￿ ￿)d
That is, if ￿ ￿ qSeq(￿1). Let us now investigate the informed player (the second mover) during the
￿rst-period game:
1. If q;￿ ￿ qSeq(￿1) the ￿rst mover cooperates in both the ￿rst and second-period game after
observing any action from the second mover. On one hand, the concerned second mover
cooperates if a+a ￿ b￿￿H
2 (b￿c)+a, which holds since ￿H
2 ￿ b￿a
b￿c. On the other hand, the
unconcerned second mover defects since a + b ￿ ￿L
2(b ￿ c) ￿ b ￿ ￿L
2(b ￿ c) + b ￿ ￿L
2(b ￿ c),
which holds since ￿L
2 < b￿a
b￿c by de￿nition. Therefore, this pooling strategy pro￿le cannot be
supported if q;￿ ￿ qSeq(￿1).
2. If q;￿ < qSeq(￿1) the ￿rst mover defects both in the ￿rst and second-period game, both
after observing that the second mover selects C and D. The concerned second mover defects,
however, since c ￿ ￿H
2 (b ￿ c) + d ￿ d + d, which implies ￿H
2 ￿ 0 ￿ c￿d
b￿c, which holds by
de￿nition. Hence, this pooling strategy pro￿le cannot be sustained if q;￿ < qSeq(￿1).
3. If q ￿ qSeq(￿1) > ￿ the ￿rst mover cooperates in the ￿rst-period game and in the second
period he cooperates only after observing C (in equilibrium). On one hand, the concerned
second mover cooperates since a + a ￿ b ￿ ￿H
2 (b ￿ c) + d, or ￿H
2 ￿ b+d￿2a
b￿c . Given that
b￿a
b￿c > b+d￿2a
b￿c , then condition ￿H
2 ￿ b+d￿2a
b￿c is satis￿ed from ￿H
2 ￿ b￿a
b￿c. On the other hand,
the unconcerned second mover cooperates since a+b￿￿L
2(b￿c) ￿ b￿￿L
2(b￿c)+d, or a ￿ d.
Hence this pooling strategy pro￿le can be supported as a PBE for q ￿ qSeq(￿1) > ￿.
4. If q < qSeq(￿1) ￿ ￿ the ￿rst mover defects in the ￿rst-period game and in the second period
he defects only after observing C (in equilibrium). The concerned second mover defects,
however, since c ￿ ￿H
2 (b ￿ c) + d ￿ d + a, which implies ￿H
2 ￿ 0 ￿ c￿a
b￿c which is satis￿ed by
de￿nition. Thus, this pooling strategy pro￿le cannot be sustained if q < qSeq(￿1) ￿ ￿. ￿
7.9 Proof of Corollary 1
Separating PBE. Let us ￿rst analyze the separating equilibrium where the ￿rst mover cooperates
when being concerned but defects otherwise. First, note that after observing an action from the
￿rst mover in the ￿rst-period game, the second mover￿ s beliefs about ￿H
1 are ￿(￿H
1 jC) = 1 and
￿(￿H
1 jD) = 0. Recall that the second mover is concerned about fairness by de￿nition, ￿2 ￿ b￿a
b￿c,
and that this information is common knowledge. Hence, the second mover￿ s best response is to
29￿mimic￿the action selected by the ￿rst mover, both in the ￿rst and second-period sequential PD
games. Regarding the ￿rst mover, when being concerned he cooperates since a + a ￿ d + d. If
unconcerned, the ￿rst mover defects (as prescribed) if a + d < d + d, which does not hold. Hence,
the separating strategy pro￿le cannot be supported as a PBE of the game.
Pooling PBE. Let us now analyze the pooling equilibrium where both types of ￿rst mover coop-
erate in the ￿rst-period game. First, note that after observing an action from the ￿rst mover during
the ￿rst period, second mover￿ s beliefs about ￿H
1 in this pooling equilibrium become ￿(￿H
1 jC) = q
and ￿(￿H
1 jD) ￿ ￿ 2 [0;1]. Because the second mover￿ s best response is to ￿mimic￿the action se-
lected by the ￿rst mover, we do not need to analyze equilibrium play under di⁄erent beliefs, as we
did in the proof of Proposition 5. Regarding the ￿rst mover, when being concerned he cooperates
since a + a ￿ d + d. If unconcerned, the ￿rst mover also cooperates (as prescribed) given that
a + d ￿ d + d. Hence, the pooling strategy pro￿le can be supported as a PBE of the game, for all
q and ￿ 2 [0;1]. ￿
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